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Abstract 
In this paper we study whether Chinese firms bid higher on average when 
involved in outbound mergers and acquisitions, compared to bidders from the rest 
of the world. We argue that the unique Chinese context due to the country’s 
spectacular economic growth and communist state control provide Chinese firms 
with different premises than firms in other parts of the world, and that this might 
affect the bid premium. Using a sample of 12.700 transactions between 1986 and 
2011, collected from Thomson Financial SDC we find evidence that Chinese 
firms do pay a higher premium for target firm in specific industries such as 
Mining and Construction. We also find that Chinese firms pay a higher premium 
when involved in outbound mergers and acquisitions after the financial crisis in 
2008.  
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1. Introduction  
Under the headline “China buys up the world” in The Economist, November 
2010, the author expresses “In theory, the ownership of business in a capitalist 
economy is irrelevant. In practice, it is very often controversial. … China’s state-
owned companies are on a shopping spree.” He further argues that Chinese 
buyers, often run by the Communist Party and sometimes driven by politics as 
well as profit, have accounted for a tenth of cross-border deals by value this year 
(2010), “bidding for everything from American gas and Brazilian electricity grids 
to a Swedish car company, Volvo”.  
 
Extensive research can be found on merger and acquisitions in general, in 
particular acquisition activity and merger waves, the value creation effects of 
M&A, and on the determinants of the takeover premium1. Much of the existing 
literature about the bid premium has focused on macroeconomic factors, 
ownership structure and deal specific characteristics such as deal type and method 
of payment, etc. Limited research has investigated the relationship between 
country specific factors and the bid premium. There exist academic articles in the 
field of International Business Management, and also non-academic articles 
stating that Chinese firms do tend to overpay when acquiring companies abroad 
(Ma and Andrews-Speed 2006, McKinsey 2008). This is also a common 
presumption among people in the world of finance, and other industries e.g. the 
Norwegian oil and gas sector. Hence the purpose of this study is to investigate 
whether or not Chinese bidders to a higher extent pay a premium when acquiring 
firms in other countries, compared to bidders in general. No previous studies in 
the field of Finance have been found with this focus.  
 
Using a sample of 12.700 transactions between 1986 and 2011, collected from 
Thomson SDC we find evidence that Chinese firms do pay a higher premium for 
target firms in the specific industry-group “Mining and Construction”, comprising 
metal mining, crude petroleum and natural gas, drilling oil and gas wells, mining 
and heavy constructions. This premium is 32.8 percent higher compared to the 
takeover premium in all other deals. Our research also finds evidence that Chinese  
                                                 
1 In this thesis premiums, bid premiums, acquisition premiums and takeover premiums is used 
interchangeably to describe the purchase price above the market value. 
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bidders pay a 50.4 percent higher premium when involved in outbound mergers 
and acquisitions after the financial crisis in 2008, compared to all other 
transactions.  
 
These findings are in line with the very limited research (Ma and Andrews-Speed 
2006) stating that Chinese national oil companies involved in oversees mergers 
and acquisitions “overbid” in these transactions. This behavior have according to 
the authors a number of causes relating to their commercial world view, their 
strategy, their inexperience and the role of the government; Chinese national oil 
companies are not primarily answerable to public shareholders with shorter time 
horizon and are not overwhelmed by fear of failure. Also a McKinsey report 
(2008) suggests that Chinese acquirers tend to overpay in more than half of all the 
deals and that capital markets on average discount the value of the combined 
entities.  
 
In this study, we do not find any evidence suggesting that Chinese bidders in 
general, during the full sample period pay a higher premium.  
 
This thesis consists of seven sections which will be presented as follows. First, a 
literature review will be presented.  The main part in this section contains relevant 
background on M&A and different studies about the determinant of the bid 
premium will be accounted for.  In the second part, a selected range of articles 
from the International Business Management field is included to give some 
understanding for why China might be considered “a special case”.  A summary 
of arguments for the hypotheses and hypotheses will be presented in the third 
section.  In Section 4 first, the dependent and independent variables as well as the 
method used to investigate the hypothesis are described, and secondly, the data 
will be presented. The execution and results will be displayed and tested in section 
5, while the final conclusion is presented in Section 6. 
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2. Literature Review 
This section will first provide a short summary of the value creating effects of 
mergers and acquisitions. This will be followed by a summary of research about 
the known determinants of the bid premium. This part is important in order to 
illustrate which factors that are previously proven to influence the bid premium, 
and hence are of importance for our methodology, when aiming to isolate the 
effect of the acquirer being Chinese. The final section presents literature from the 
field of International Business Management on the determinants of Chinese 
outbound M&A, with the purpose to introduce the motivations for Chinese firms 
to pay a premium, which again provide support for our hypothesis.   
 
2.1 Value creation through Mergers and Acquisitions 
The question of whether acquisitions create value has been debated by academics 
and other researchers for decades. It can be argued that acquisitions create value 
for the target shareholders based on the fact that the average acquisition premium 
is about 30 percent above the pre-announcement share price (Koller et al. 2010).  
 
Roll (1986) was the first to suggest that bidder’s overconfidence may go a long 
way in explaining the surprisingly low bidder takeover gains. He formed the 
Hubris hypothesis, which implies that individual decision makers in bidding firms 
may pay a premium to acquire an asset that the market has already correctly 
valued for their own personal motives. Bidding firms infected by hubris simply 
pay too much for their targets.  
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) summarize previous research about value 
creation in merger and acquisition activity. They find that researchers indicate that 
even if takeovers trigger substantial value increase at their announcement, most of 
these gains are captured by the targets’ shareholders. There are varying magnitude 
related to these gains and their distribution between target and bidder shareholders 
vary across decades and depend on the deal type. All in all, increase in the market 
values of the combined firms does not support the anticipated synergistic gains. A 
substantial decline in the acquiring firms’ share price is observed over the first 
five years subsequent to the event.  
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2.2 Determinants of the bid premium 
While there are extensive research covering M&A in general and the reasons 
behind acquisition activity as well as the value creation effects of mergers, less 
attention has been given to explanation of variations in the takeover premium. In 
theory, the highest premium a value maximizing bidder would pay for a firm 
equals the net benefits of the synergies expected from the combined entity. This 
would result in a net present value transaction of zero for the bidder and therefor 
the actual bid is expected to be below this level (Walkling and Edmister 1985). 
Potential bids below the current market price is abandoned in literature (Roll 
1986) since rational target shareholder would turn down offers to buy their shares 
below what is expected in an arm’s length transaction on the stock exchange. This 
gives us a natural range for both the bid and the bid premium.  
 
Exhibit 2.1 below summarizes prior research on determinants of the acquisition 
premium. These studies will be discussed in more detail.  
2.2.1 Summary of research about the bid premium 
Author Method  Data Sample Premium 
definition 
Significant variables 
+/- 
Bates & Lemmon 
(2003) 
OLS 
Regression 
3,037 
takeovers 
during 1989 
and 1998.  
Bid price/Market 
price 42 days prior 
announcement. 
Target termination fee Indicator (+), 
Bidder termination fee Indicator (-), 
Stock offer (+), Tender offer (+), 
Bidder toehold (+), Log market value 
of equity (-) 
Betton, Eckbo 
and Thorburn 
(2008b) 
Regression 5,921 
takeovers 
between 1980 
and 2002. 
 
Bid price/ Market 
price 42 days prior 
to announcement 
 
Bidder is a public company (+), cash 
offer (+), Run-up (+), Mark-up (-)., 
Target B/M exceeds Industry B/M (-
), Tender offer (-), Positive toehold 
(-) 
Billett and 
Ryngaert (1997) 
NLS 
Regression 
 
145 cash 
tender offers 
during 1980-
1989 
Bid price/Market 
value prior to 
announcement 
Multiple bidders (+), 
Liabilities/Equity (+),  Financial 
assets/Equity (-), Percentages of 
shares sought (+) 
Dionne, La Haye 
& Bergerès 
(2011) 
Regression 1026 takeover 
transactions, 
American 
Bid price/ Market 
price 42 days prior 
to announcement 
Blockholders (-), Sales growth (-), 
Size (-), Public purchase offer (+), 
Hostility (+) 
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public targets  
Flanagan & 
O´Shaughnessy 
(2003)  
 
Regression 285 US tender 
offers in 
manufacturing 
industry 
between 1986-
1995  
Bid price/Market 
price 4 weeks prior 
to announcement  
 
Percent of target held (-), White 
Knight (+), Multiple bidders (+), 
Core-related (+)  
 
Hope, Thomas & 
Vyas (2010) 
Regression  During 1990 - 
2007 
Bid price per share 
/ target closing 
price 4 weeks prior 
to the bid 
announcement. 
Developing countries (+), Target 
shareholder protection (+), Net assets 
(-), Profit margin (+), %Sought (+), 
Competing bid (+), Financial buyer 
 (-) 
Li, Levi & Zhang Regression 458 
acquisition 
bids 
Bid price/  Market 
price 4 weeks prior 
to the bid 
announcement 
Bidder % female CEO (-),  
All Stock (-), 
Bidder ROA (+), Tender offer (+)  
Moeller (2005)     
 
OLS 
regression 
373 US 
transactions 
1990-1999 
Bid price/Market 
price 6 days prior 
to announcement 
Target shareholder control (+), 
Hostile bid (+), Fraction paid with 
cash (+), MV Target/MV Bidder (-) 
Ross and Volpin 
(2004) 
Regression 4007 
transactions 
during 1990 
and 1999  
Bid price/Market 
price 4 weeks prior 
to announcement 
Shareholder protection (+), Target 
size (-), Cross-border (+), Tender 
offer s (+), Opposing bid (+),  
Walkling and 
Edmister  
(1985) 
  
 
Regression   
 
108 US tender 
offers between 
1972-1977 
Bid price/Market 
price 14 days prior 
to announcement 
Debt/Assets (-) , Market Value/Book 
Value (-), Opposing bidder (+), 
Control of 50% sought (+), % of 
shares controlled (-) 
 
2.2.2 Previous research 
Walkling and Edmister (1985) investigate 108 US cash tender offers between 
1972 and 1977, where they aim at answer the hypotheses; that premium size is a 
positive function of potential acquisition related benefits, and a negative function 
of the bargaining power of the bidder.  They construct a cross-sectional regression 
model including the target firm’s debt, the target firm’s net working capital, 
bargaining strength variables, such as the percentage of target shares controlled by 
the bidder prior to the offer (toehold), and valuation related variables to explain 
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the premium. With a bulk of premiums lying in the 20 to 50 percent range, they 
find that firms with declining amounts of leverage and firms with relatively low 
valuations ratios command significantly higher premiums. Bargaining strength 
(the percentage of shares controlled) and the ability to acquire enough shares to be 
able to implement potentially beneficial changes (control of 50% Sought) is also 
significant.  
 
Billett and Ryngaert (1997) have developed a model that demonstrates a direct 
link between the percentage premium paid and two factors that had not been 
examined before: shareholders and the target firm’s capital structure and asset 
structure. The hypotheses they lay out are based on two arguments. First, the use 
of debt financing serves to increases the takeover premiums paid to shareholders 
because an improvement in the target’s assets through redeployment, which is 
independent of the firms financing structure, because the premium is spread over 
a smaller equity base. The second argument is that the premium will be smaller 
for firms with a higher ratio of financial assets to equity. The authors argue that, 
takeovers of non-financial firms generally takes place because the bidder believes 
it can better utilize the non-financial assets of the target as opposed to the target’s 
financial assets. Using a sample of 145 cash tender offers for publicly traded 
companies during the period 1980 and 1989, they find that firm asset structure and 
capital structure have a significant impact on percentage tender offer premiums 
paid to shareholders. Tender offer premiums increase with a target firm’s liability 
to equity ratio and decrease with target firm’s financial asset to equity ratio.  
 
This result is somewhat contradictive to conventional wisdom of takeovers that 
view firms with low debt level and high ratio of financial assets as attractive 
targets, which is discussed by Walkling and Edmister (1985). The inverse 
relationship between the bid premium and the target firm’s financial asset to 
equity ratio is thus in line with Roll’s hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986). The severity 
of the winner’s curse, and hence the degree of overpayment, increases in the 
variance of the of the bidders’ estimates of target value. In this case, the variation 
in these estimates may be smaller for firms with easier to value financial assets, 
leading to less overpayment, smaller takeover premiums and the inverse relation 
between the targets’ takeover premium and its proportion of financial assets.  
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Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2003) examine the relationship between core-
relatedness and multiple bidders on the takeover premium in 285 tender offers in 
the US manufacturing industry during 1986 and 1995.  In a core-related M&A, 
the primary business of the acquirer is the same which means vertically connected 
to or similar to the primary business of the target firm. The authors find a 
significant interaction effect between multiple bidders and core-related 
acquisitions. In the absence of multiple bidders, the premium is significantly 
higher when the transaction is not core-related.  
 
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008b) investigate cross-sectional determinants of 
the bid premium by analyzing 5,921 targets between 1980 and 2002. They 
categorize explanatory variables into “Target characteristics”, “Bidder 
characteristics”, and “Deal characteristics”  and their main findings are as follows; 
First, the initial and final offer premiums are higher after the 1980s, when the 
bidder is a public company; when the initial bid is an all-cash offer, and the higher 
the pre-bid target run-up. Secondly, important findings from this study are that the 
initial and final offer premiums are lower the greater the target total equity 
capitalization prior to the initial bid; when the target’s book-to-market ratio (B/M) 
exceeds the industry median B/M; when the initial bid is a tender offer; and when 
the initial bidder has a positive toehold. Thirdly, the initial and final offer 
premiums are unaffected by the presence of a target poison pill, a target hostility 
to the initial bid; the presence of multiple bidders; and whether the takeover is 
horizontal (Betton et al. 2008b). 
 
Levi, Li, Zhang (2008) combine data from both SDC and RiskMetrics Group and 
suggest that the takeover premium are influenced by the gender composition of 
the board. Accurately, bid premiums are lower when the CEO of the acquiring 
firm is female, and the higher the target board’s proportion of female directors.  
 
When it comes to examining country- or region-specific factors and difference in 
the bid premium, it has been difficult to find a lot of research. Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) study the determinants of mergers and acquisitions around the world by 
focusing on differences in law and regulations across countries. They find that the 
volume of M&A activity is significantly larger in countries with better accounting 
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standards and shareholder protection, and also that the bid premiums is higher in 
countries with higher shareholder protection.  
 
Thus, more relevant to our research question; Hope, Thomas and Vyas (2010) aim 
at analyzing if the higher bids by firms from developing countries are affected by 
national pride, and in doing so, tests their data on bid premiums between 
developing and developed countries using an extensive amount of control 
variables. By doing so, they find that the bid premiums in transactions with 
bidding firms from developing countries, where the target is located in a 
developed country, are higher than the bid premium in outbound M&As from 
developed countries. 
 
2.3 Determinants of Chinese mergers and Acquisitions 
A growing number of articles have been published the last years which looks at 
the motivations of Chinese firms to expand internationally. Most researchers 
(Buckley et al. 2007, Morck, 2007, etc) agree that classical motivations in the 
international business management field do play the key role: Chinese firms are to 
various extents market-seeking, resource-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking. 
However, these characteristics, originally developed in a Western context and for 
Western companies, do not completely reveal all motivations of Chinese 
outbound investments (Gugler and Boie 2008). 
 
Buckley et al. (2007) argue that there are three potential arguments to why foreign 
direct investments (FDI) from emerging economies and China in particular 
require a different approach than theory applied to industrialized countries. These 
are; capital market imperfections, the special ownership advantages of Chinese 
multinational corporations and institutional factor. 
 
Capital market imperfections, which implies that capital is available at below 
market rates for a considerable period of time, exists in China for a number of 
particular inter-related reasons; Warner et al. (2004) and others suggests that state-
owned (and state-associated) firms may have capital made available to Chinese 
firms at below market rates. They also points at the fact that inefficient banking 
systems may make soft loans to potential outward investors. Third, conglomerate 
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firms may operate an internal inefficient capital market that subsidizes outflow 
M&A’s (Liu 2005), and finally, family-owned firms may have access to cheap 
capital from family members. Buckley et al. (2007) argue that there are good 
reasons to believe that all four of these imperfections exist in China. “State-
sponsored soft budget constraints make acquisitions by Chinese firms a normal 
mode of entering and penetrating a host economy.” (Buckley et al. 2007, 7) 
 
Ma and Andrews-Speed (2006) specifically discuss the reasons why Chinese 
national oil companies “overbid”. They lists reasons in addition to capital market 
imperfection as already mentioned above, such as: their commercial world view, 
their strategy, their inexperience and the role of the government. Close support 
from the Chinese government may indeed lower the political risk in some 
countries, which combined with access to loans from state-owned commercial 
banks will result in China’s national oil companies having a lower cost of capital 
than international oil companies. The authors addresses the question on which 
cases of “overbidding” are the result of deliberate strategy and which are the result 
of inexperience, as one of their major questions.  
 
2.4 Summary of literature review 
Previous research on the bid premium is of great importance when aiming at 
constructing the best model for our analysis, in order to isolate the effect of our 
key explanatory variable.  Despite the relatively large amount of papers 
examining determinants of the bid premium, there are relatively few studies 
analyzing country- and region specific factors. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that 
the bid premiums is higher in countries with higher shareholder protection, while 
Hope et al. (2010) find that the bid premiums in transactions with bidding firms 
from developing countries, where the target is located in a developed country, are 
higher than the bid premium in outbound M&As from developed countries. No 
previous studies in the field of Finance studying the Chinese bid premium have 
been found. In the field of International Business Management, extensive research 
on Chinese outbound investments has been carried out. And numerous of 
researchers points at different reasons to why these investments must be analyzed 
differently from investments from other countries. Buckley et al. (2007) points at 
three specific reasons, which are capital market imperfections, the special 
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ownership advantages of Chinese multinational corporations and institutional 
factor. Finally, Ma and Andrews-Speed (2006) specifically discuss the reasons 
why Chinese national oil companies “overbid”, unfortunately due to the design of 
international business research; it is not apparent how these findings are proven. 
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3. Hypothesis 
In the following section we make an attempt demonstrate the reasoning behind 
our research problem: whether Chinese bidders pay a higher premium when 
acquiring assets outside of China compared to other bidders. We do so by 
categorizing and summarizing the arguments based on three main factors in line 
with classical valuation theory; synergies, cost of capital and the computation of 
free cash flow. These arguments are based on the assumption that the Chinese 
domestic market is not at all times efficient in line with classical financial theories 
(Buckley et al. 2007, McKinsey 2008, Deloitte 2009 and Warren et al. 2004). 
 
3.1 Chinese overbidding 
As described introductory, we have not been able to find any academic research 
investigating our main hypothesis; the bid premiums in outbound Chinese M&A 
are higher than for deals in general. However, a McKinsey report from 2008 goes 
far in claiming that this is the fact. It states that Chinese firms do “overpay” in 
international deals. Unfortunately, the financial analyses behind their conclusions 
are not clear.  
 
This report (McKinsey 2008) claims that;  
“They (Chinese firms) have underwhelmed the market by the standard of 
value creation measured thorough share price movement around the time 
of announcement, namely, the deal value added, and proportion overpaid. 
Although, drawn from a relatively small sample, our analysis suggests that 
Chinese acquirers tend to overpay in a little more than half of all deals and 
that the capital markets on average discount the value of the combined 
entities.” (McKinsey 2008, 11)  
 
The report further argues that deals of Chinese bidder firms between 1995 and 
2007 performed less favorably compared to deals from other countries (McKinsey 
2008) 
 
A Deloitte publication (2009) that also examines Chinese outflow M&A deals, 
have findings which we find connectable to the McKinsey report. Head of 
Deloitte China M&A Services & Global Chinese Services Group Co-Chairman, 
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Lawrence Chia, argues that state-sanctioned acquisitions are an important driver 
for Chinese outflow M&As; “with Chinese state-owned enterprises being offered 
large loans or credit agreements at preferential rates in order to purchase foreign 
assets” (Deloitte 2009, 7-8). Also, Chia states that Chinese state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are conducting outbound M&A acquisitions as they look to grow their 
business in order to prevent takeover bids from lager domestic rivals. “Buying 
assets overseas is a sign of strength … In addition; such businesses do not have to 
return cash to any stakeholders and are therefore in a position to finance such 
acquisitions.” (Deloitte 2009, 8) 
 
The next section will provide a more detailed explanation on how these two 
reports are related, and might explain some of the variance in the bid premium 
cross section. 
 
3.2 Summary of Chinese Bid Premium arguments 
In accordance with both microeconomic and finance theory, in a common value 
auction, the value of the item being sold is the same for all bidders (Norli 2011).   
Applying discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation methods in theory, three main 
factors can influence the variance in bids (offer prices) in mergers and 
acquisitions. These are the cost of capital, potential synergies and the actual 
computation of free cash flow. 
3.2.1 Synergies 
In line with classical theories, the highest premium a value maximizing bidder 
would pay for a firm equals the net benefits of the synergies expected from the 
combined entities. The new wave of Chinese firms acquiring international brands 
combined with the countries low production costs and access to the world’s 
largest market is an obvious Chinese synergy advantage (Kristoffersen and Gao 
2012). Synergies are unique to the bidder, thus may very well give optimally 
higher bids. Geely’s acquisition of Swedish Volvo, suffering from economic 
distress, in 2010 is a good example of this. While Kristoffersen and Gao (2012) 
states that the success of synergies of this combined entity remains to be 
confirmed, the Volvo’s Annual Report 2011 does exactly so. For the full year 
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Volvo generated the highest net sales, the best operating income and the highest 
operating margin in the firm’s history.  
3.2.2 Cost of capital  
The cost of capital (WACC) is determined by target characteristics which are the 
target capital structure, the cost of equity and the after-tax cost of debt. None of 
these variables are directly observable, and we normally employ various models, 
approximations and assumptions to estimate each component (Koller et. al 2010).  
 
The literature in the Determinants of Chinese mergers and acquisitions section, 
mentions several factors which may affect the classical cost of capital equation, 
when it comes to the cost of equity and after-tax cost of debt component. These 
are capital market imperfections and the special ownership structures of Chinese 
multinational corporations. Capital market imperfections, which implies that 
capital is available at below market rates for a considerable period of time 
(Warner et al. 2004) and the Chinese ownership structure will be further described 
below.  
 
Going Global strategy 
The Chinese Going Global strategy was officially launched in 2000 with the 
intentions to promote international operations of capable Chinese firms with a 
view to improve resource allocation and enhancing their international 
competitiveness. In practice this involved making a formerly inflexible system 
less complex and more adaptable for Chinese firms wishing to invest 
internationally. Components of this strategy was among others; export tax rebates, 
financial assistance, foreign exchange assistance, and other incentives to Chinese 
enterprises wishing to invest in overseas markets (Salidjanova 2011). The changes 
following this initiative, made Chinese outward direct investment increased with 
more than 600% from 2000 till 2001 (Reve et al. 2012). 
 
Outward FDI as Industrial Policy 
The Chinese government use foreign direct investments as major part of its 
industrial policy. Already in 2004, guidelines were developed comprising 
recommended sectors and countries in which Chinese firms should invest. In 
particular the guidelines embraced infrastructure contributing to export of Chinese 
technology, and acquisitions promoting Chinese firms’ international competitive 
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power. Outbound M&A in the energy and minerals sector was also strongly 
encouraged to meet the growing needs in the country (Deng 2009 and UNCTAD 
2006). The Chinese Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) was 
instructed to arrange guarantee schemes within the preferred sectors, while Exim 
Bank (China Export and Import Bank), CDB (China Development Bank) and the 
other 4 major state banks was directed to follow up with financial support to 
Chinese firms’ outbound investments (Reve et al. 2012).  
 
Foreign currency reserves 
4 out of the worlds’ 10 largest investment funds are Chinese. China Investment 
Corporation, known from the Norwegian press as the being one of the 10 largest 
owners of Marine Harvest, and the 7th largest owner of DNB is one of these. 
SAFE Investment Company, registered in Hong Kong as a private company, is the 
subsidiary of Chinas State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the 
governmental body responsible for managing the country’s foreign currency 
reserves.  
 
Due to Chinas positive trade balance over a long period of time, the nation has 
developed huge foreign currency reserves. Early 2011, these reserves exceeded 
staggering USD 3000 billion, tenfold compared to 10 years ago, which has led to 
China being a major creditor to the rest of the world (Chen 2012). Several of 
authors point at how this enables China to steadily increase investments in savings 
capital, at the same time as they secures both knowledge and access to natural 
resources and energy (Chen 2012). The acquisition of Norwegian Elkem in 2011 
is an example on this.  
 
The sections above is meant to give a relatively short introduction to how the 
financial premises for Chinese firms engaging in outbound M&A differ from 
firms in other parts of the world. Our argument is that loans at below market rate, 
tax rebates, and other financial support might affect the cost of equity and the 
after-tax cost of debt, and hence provide Chinese bidding firms with a lower cost 
of capital. If the cost of capital is low, it would leave the bidder to overpay. This 
presumption is backed by both the McKinsey report (2008) arguing that Chinese 
firms tend to overpay in a little more than half of all deals and that Chinese bidder 
firms involved in outbound M&A between 1995 and 2007 performed less 
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favorably compared to bidder from other countries, and Ma and Andrews-Speed 
(2006) when it comes to Chinese oil companies. From this we form our first 
hypothesis “The bid premiums in outbound Chinese M&A are higher than for 
deals in general “.  
3.2.3 Computing the Free Cash Flow 
All sorts of errors and differences in expectations can occur, when analyzing and 
trying to compute the free cash flow in order to value a potential object. In what 
way might this element be influenced by the acquiring nation being Chinese?  
 
Inexperienced leaders 
One main factor, highlighted in literature as well as the media is the inexperience 
of Chinese business leaders. While success stories of Chinese M&A definitely can 
be found, the Geely and Volvo case is already mentioned earlier in this section, 
Reve (2012) argues that about 70 percent of Chinese outbound M&A had failed 
by the end of 2008. A report from Asia Pacific Foundation and Canada China 
Council for Promotion of International Trade (2010) present what Chinese leaders 
themselves claims to be major challenges when investing in Canada, which are: 
(1) lack of expertise and knowledge concerning international management, (2) 
challenging to find a local partner, and (3) lack of knowledge about legal matters 
and market risks. “Chinese companies regularly seem to misjudge the political, 
labor, and environmental risks that the foreign business world presents” 
(McKinsey 2008, 2). Off course, this does not necessarily mean that Chinese 
firms do pay too much when acquiring abroad, but with such a short record in the 
global market, compared to the current scope of investments, this may not seem 
like an unrealistic possible explanation.  
 
Professor Zhao Youzhen2 at School of Management at Fudan University supports 
this argument. She highlights that inexperienced leaders may be the reason for 
why Chinese firms pays a higher premium, compared to other deals. Further she 
argues that Chinese management lack experience in the international market and 
that talents are few among them, as a consequent they are unfamiliar with the 
business practice wildly accepted in the western world. Talented management  
                                                 
2 (Seminar “Trends and Challenges of Chinese Firms' Internationalization” Nordic Center, 
Shanghai, 29th Oct, 2011). 
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can also be seen as an asset worth paying a premium for if it is possible to secure 
their future in the company she states (Seminar “Trends and Challenges of 
Chinese Firms' Internationalization” Nordic Center, Shanghai, 29th Oct, 2011). 
 
3.3 Sub hypotheses 
The main hypothesis already described is as follows; the bid premiums in 
outbound Chinese M&A are higher than for deals in general. However, there are 
several of related factors also interesting to analyze in order to get a deeper 
understanding of the core issues in our economic question. The aim of the Going 
Global strategy was to improve resource allocation and enhance Chinese firms’ 
international competitiveness by tax rebates, below market rate loans and other 
financial support. These measures were implemented in 2000, and hence we may 
see a difference before and after this year. The first sub hypothesis in this thesis is 
therefor; the bid premium in outbound Chinese M&A is higher after the Chinese 
Going Global strategy was implemented in 2000. 
 
The motives behind the Going Global strategy, combined with guidelines 
implemented in 2004 that comprises recommended sectors and countries in which 
Chinese firms should invest, is the background for our third hypothesis: The bid 
premium in outbound Chinese M&A is higher in certain industries, such as 
energy and mineral sectors, and industries comprising infrastructure contributing 
to export of Chinese technology, compared to other deals.  
 
As an extension to the reasons why it might be likely to believe that the bid 
premium is higher in deals with a Chinese bidder, we would like to investigate the 
fourth and final hypothesis; The bid premium in outbound Chinese M&A differ 
after the 2008 financial crisis. A lot of articles and reports the past last years has 
focused on the significant decline in M&A volumes from the financial crisis in 
2007 and 2008, with a particular retrenchment in cross-border activity. Despite 
this, Asian companies, with China as a major participant has continued to increase 
their presence. “Firms from the Asian region accounted for 26 percent of global 
M&A in 2009, up significantly from 20 percent in 2007 and 2008, not to mention 
10 percent in 2000 and 2001” (McKinsey 2010, 18).  
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4. Methodology 
The following section will first specify the econometric models used in this study. 
Secondly, we describe our sample and the criteria followed in order to ensure the 
quality of the data.  
 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Multiple regression model 
In order to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables, we run the following OLS3 regression; 
 
Log(Bid Premium) =  +  (China dummy variable) +  (Control variables) + ε  
 
For a multiple regression, a dependent variable and a number of independent 
variables are needed. In this study the independent variables are the key 
explanatory variable, acquirer country and control variables used to isolate the 
effect on the bid premium of the acquirer being Chinese. This methodology is 
consistent with previous research on the bid premium presented earlier in this 
paper.  
4.1.2 The dependent variable  
The dependent variable in the study is the bid premium. The premium is the bid 
price as a percentage of the closing price four weeks before announcement of the 
deal, as defined in Thomson SDC.  
4.1.3 The independent variables 
Key explanatory variable 
The key explanatory variable will be the acquirer’s country. A dummy variable is 
applied in order to identify whether the acquirer country is Chinese and involved 
in an outbound transaction. 
 
Testing the sub-hypothesis related to time period and industry we multiply the 
dummy variables in question, and by this create the desired variables; Hypothesis 
2; Chinese bidder*Transaction after 2000, Hypothesis 3; Chinese bidder*Industry 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis  01.09.2012 
Page 20 
SIC1000-1999 and Chinese bidder*Transaction after 2000* Industry SIC1000-
1999 and finally for the last hypothesis, Chinese bidder*Transaction after 2008. 
 
Control variables 
Control variables are included to better construct a model with high explanatory 
power and significant variables. As carefully illustrated in the theory section, they 
have been found significant in previous research when testing the bid premium. 
By including these control variables the model becomes more robust, as the 
dependent variable, the bid premium is affected by several factors. The control 
variables are used to keep these factors constant and hence the relationship 
between the acquirer being Chinese and the bid premium can be isolated. In 
addition to previous studies, data availability and missing data in the datasets have 
had a large impact on the control variables chosen. 
 
Table 4.1 Overview of Control variables 
This table presents the control variables used in order to isolate the effect of the acquirer 
being Chinese. The table also includes information about how many of the Chinese 
observations in the set (in total 81) that have this variable.  
 
Quantitative 
variables  Definition 
Status Chinese 
outbound deals 
1) Target 
Target size 
Enterprise value at Announcement Date: Is 
calculated by multiplying the number of target 
actual shares outstanding from the most recent 
source available by the offer price and then by 
adding the cost to acquire convertible securities, 
plus short-term debt, straight debt, and 
preferred equity minus cash and marketable 
securities. Defined in Thomson SDC.  
79/81 
Market value/Book 
value  
Target market value / Target book value as 
defined in Thomson SDC. 
30/81 
Too much missing 
data, variable not 
included as control 
variable 
Leverage 
Target Long term debt / Shareholders equity as 
defined in Thomson SDC.   
45/81 
Too much missing 
data, variable not 
included as control 
variable 
2) Bidder 
Acquirer 
Termination Fee 
 
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquirer pay a fee to target if the deal is not 
completed.  
81/81 
Percentage held at 
Announcement 
Percentage of common, or common equivalent, 
shares outstanding held by the acquirer as of the 
26/81 
Too much missing 
                                                                                                                                     
3 Ordinary Least Square 
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announcement date as defined in Thomson 
SDC. 
data, variable not 
included as control 
variable 
3) Deal characteristics 
Cash payment 
Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if 
the bid is a cash bid 
65/81 
% Shares owned 
after Transaction Percent of shares owned after the transaction 
78/81 
% Shares Sought 
Percentage of outstanding shares sought by the 
acquirer 
81/81 
Transaction Value 
Log of value of transaction,  as defined in 
Thomson SDC 
81/81 
LBO 
Leveraged Buyout. Thomson SDC includes 
transaction in which management forms a part 
of the investor group (MBO) in this definition, 
as well as transactions that are identifies as an 
LBO in the financial press if majority interest 
of the company is acquired 
81/81 
 
4.2 Empirical data 
4.2.1 Sources and Data collection 
In order to execute this study, data from three different sources, Thomson 
Financial SDC, mergermarket and Zephyr, has been collected. There are several 
reasons for this. Almost all previous research referred to in the bid premium 
theory section has employed data from Thomson Financial SDC. But due to the 
limited amount of Chinese outbound deals, it was natural to also explore other 
options, in order for our analysis to be as accurate and valid as possible. Zephyr, 
the library database showed to have a very limited number of observations. The 
third source, mergermarkets, came to our attention through a Deloitte report 
(2009), which referred to a higher amount of deals than the initial datasets 
contained, and interesting result when it comes to overbidding in Chinese 
outbound M&A deals. Finally, the possibilities of comparing results from three 
different sources, is also a major reason for extracting data from these databases, 
and hence strengthen a possible acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. Because 
the definitions of main measures vary in the different datasets and due to the 
degree of incompleteness data observations (Zephyr and mergermarkets) when it 
comes to the control variables, the datasets cannot be added together and the 
results cannot be compared.  
 
That being said, the main sample examined in the analysis is collected from 
Thomson Financial SCD. The reasons for choosing this dataset is it’s superiority 
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when it comes to the number of observations (including Chinese observations), 
the time horizon, it’s completeness when it comes to the control variables, and 
finally the possibilities of comparing the results to previous research.   
4.2.2 The Sample 
Choice of the time period and geographic region 
The choice of time period was decided by the data availability. The time period 
stretching from the early 1986 to today and hence covers several of crises, i.a. in 
recent time the financial crisis (2007-2009) and the ongoing financial cries part 
two.  
 
This thesis focuses on Chinese cross-border M&A activity. Hence, the geographic 
requirement is that the acquirer should be of a Chinese, Hong Kong or Taiwan 
nationality and the target placed outside the region of China, Hong Kong or 
Taiwan. These three countries are all under Chinese authority, hence has natural 
arguments for why they should be matched. This has been done in other research 
(Deloitte 2009), and finally, it was necessary in order to obtain enough data. 
Throughout this thesis bidders from these three nationalities, involved in 
acquisitions outside this region will be referred to as “Chinese bidders”.  
 
Industry 
A sub hypothesis is that Chinese acquiring firms are willing to pay a higher 
premium for targets in some industries compared to others. This is connected with 
the facts presented in the hypothesis chapter regarding the Chinese Going Global 
strategy and the 2004 guidelines by the Chinese government encouraging and 
providing i.a. cheaper loans to Chinese firms engaging in M&A in certain 
industries. These are natural resources and investments in infrastructure (Reve et 
al. 2012, McKinsey 2008, and others). To isolate relevant companies and deals, 
different branch codes and classifications can be used. For this purpose different 
branch of industries has been defined using US SIC codes. The group which 
matches what we aim at analyzing in accordance with hypothesis 3 is SIC group 
1000-1999, Mining and construction, which comprises metal mining, crude 
petroleum and natural gas, drilling oil and gas wells, mining and quarrying of 
nonmetallic minerals, and heavy construction (www.siccode.com).  
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Table 4.2 SIC Code Category and amount of Chinese outbound deals 
This table presents the number of Chinese outbound deals in some of the main SIC code 
groups, defined by Thomson Financial SDC. This overview is relevant for hypothesis 3, 
investigating whether the premium is higher in deals in certain industries. The overview 
is based on our sample of 12 700 takeover transactions, between 1986 and 2011.  
SIC Code Category Chinese outbound deals 
1000-1999 Mining and construction 24 
2000-3999 Manufacturing 28 
6000-6999 Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
11 
7000-7999 Services 7 
 
 
Sample formation 
In order to extract an accurate measure for bid premium only public companies 
are included in our analysis. We identified the takeover transactions through the 
Thomson Financial SDC database, and target successful transactions that occurred 
between March 1, 1986 and December 31, 2011. We initially observed 20,091 
deals.  
Table 4.3 Sample formation 
This table presents the transactions that are eliminated because they do not fulfill the 
criteria’s needed for a complete data set, in line with the criteria formulated above 
Criteria/deleted deals Total deals Chinese outbound deals 
Total amount of deals from start 20 091 170 
Deleted negative bid premium 3008 40 
Deleted non-completed deals 4282 47 
Deleted deals <50 % 101 2 
Total 12 700 81 
 
Following Rolls arguments (applied in Officer 2003, Lemmon and Bates 2003, 
Hope et al. 2010, and others) the second requirement is that the bid premium is 
greater than zero.  This restriction follows extant research and is employed to 
ensure economic reasonableness of the bid premium data (Hope et al. 2010). 
Specifically, Officer (2003) criticizes the measure of bid premium using SDC 
price data on grounds that has a tendency of reporting outliers below zero (an 
economically reasonable lower bound). Bids below the current market price is 
abandoned in literature, since rational target shareholder would turn down offers 
to buy their shares below what is expected in an arm’s length transaction on the 
stock exchange (Roll 1986). Following this argument, we eliminated 3008 
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transactions in total, of which 40 Chinese outbound deals were of non-positive 
character and respectively 4,282 deals in general and 47 Chinese that were not 
completed.  
 
A final requirement is that the acquiring firm stake is exceeding 50 percent after 
the acquisition. The reason for this criterion is our desire to analyze strategic and 
long term acquisitions, which might not be the case when the deal is of a smaller 
size, which implies a financial character and a shorter term horizon. Previous 
research have fund that acquiring a majority stake (over 50 percent) have a 
significant effect on the size of the bid premium compared to acquire smaller 
stakes (Walking & Edmister 1985). This lead us to eliminate 101 common deals 
and two Chinese outbound deals, as illustrated in table 4.3. 
 
After this elimination, we obtained a final sample of 12,700 transactions 
containing 81 Chinese outbound transactions. 
 
Revision of the data 
The data has been reviewed manually and data showing obvious errors have been 
eliminated. As noted by Officer (2003), Bates and Lemmon (2003) and others, the 
premiums computed using SDC data are very noisy and includes many large 
outliers. We address this criticism by using premiums greater than zero, by 
deleting obvious errors, and winsorizing extreme observations. Following Officer, 
the bid premium measure is equal to our primary measure when its value is 
greater than zero and less than the interval of the upper fence, defined as 
Q2+3*IQR4. This outlier detection criterion, beyond an outer fence which is 
considered extreme outliers, is included in order to get accurate estimators. While 
the data with obvious errors was deleted, 417 in total and 7 Chinese extreme 
values were replaced with the closest non extreme value, in line with the 
Winsorize method (Wilcox 2010, 152). The upper fence corresponded to a bid 
premium of 155.92 %. The aim of this method is to keep as much information as 
possible.  
 
                                                 
4 Q2+3*IQR = Quartile 2 (the median of the dataset) + 3* the interquartile range, which is the 
difference between Q3 and Q1 (quartile 3- quartile 1).  
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4.3 Modeling difficulties 
Missing values 
The datasets had problems with missing values. As illustrated in table 4.1, due to 
the limited number of Chinese outbound deals, we have had to elimination a lot of 
control variables which we initially wished to examine in order not to reduce the 
sample size when running the regression. 
 
The tradeoff between number of observations and control variables has been 
carefully carried out throughout the analysis. One by one control variable is added 
in order to ensure that the reduced number of observations does not affect the 
outcome in other variables. Also, it is ensured that the limited amount of deals 
with Chinese bidders is not at all affected by missing values in the control 
variables. This applies to the regression analysis in all hypotheses. When 
constructing the model we applied the general-to-specific methodology (Brooks 
2008). It is conducted as follows: first a large model with lots of variables on the 
right hand side is assembled known as a generalized unrestricted model. The next 
step is to reparameterise5 the model by knocking out very insignificant repressors. 
If the assumption of classical linear regression model (CLRM) is held we have a 
statistically adequate empirical model that can be used to test underlying financial 
theories (Brooks 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The process of deciding and defining the parameters necessary for a complete or relevant specification of a model. 
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5. Results 
In this section the statistical results and implementation of the study will be 
described.  
 
5.1 Statistical description of the premium 
Figure 5.1 presents the average premium for each year of the study period, and 
illustrates how it varies over time. The average premium peeks in 1988 and 1990 
before it takes a few dips and has another peak in 2008.  
 
Figure 5.1 Average bid premium 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Chinese bids in general 
The dependent variable in our model, namely the premium paid by the bidder, 
varies considerably. Table 5.2 contains a statistical description on the premiums, 
according to our hypotheses. Panel A shows that the average premium in the full 
dataset is 45.5 percent, the standard deviation is 36.1 and the median is 36.0 
percent. The average premium offered by Chinese bidders is a little higher at 47.1 
percent, while the median is quite a lot lower at 29.4 percent. These results does 
not give us any indications that we will be able to reject the null hypothesis, 
stating that the bid premiums in outbound Chinese M&A are not higher than for 
deals in general. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive of the determinant variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on the dependent variable, the bid premium, 
namely the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum. It illustrates the 
different values, when splitting up the main sample in several of subsamples, in order to 
analyze the spreads in accordance with our hypothesis. H1 denote hypothesis 1, H2 is 
Hypothesis 2, etc.. All figures in the tables are percentages.  
Dependent variable 
Bid premium 4 
weeks  
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Min Max Number 
of obs. 
Premium 
spread 
PANEL A 
H1: All deals SCD 45.517 36.100 36.000 0.030 155.920 12700  
H1: Chinese Deals 47.134 44.827 29.410 0.840 155.920 81 1.617 
PANEL B 
H2: Before 2001 
All deals 
49.019 35.714 40.360 0.080 155.920 6069  
H2: Before 2001 
Chinese deals 
40.170 38.809 25.225 7.140 155.920 18 -8.849 
H2: After 2001 
All deals 
42.312 36.156 32.210 0.030 155.920 6631  
H2: After 2001 
Chinese deals 
49.124 46.495 32.870 0.840 155.920 63 6.812 
PANEL C 
H3: SIC 1000-1999 
All deals 
45.963 38.393 34.690 0.230 155.920 1236  
H3: SIC 1000-1999  
Chinese deals 
58.178 42.812 43.020 5.910 155.920 24 12.215 
PANEL D 
H4: Before 2008 
All deals 
44.737 35.395 35.480 0.030 155.920 10530  
H4: Before 2008 
Chinese deals 
33.682 36.223 22.160 0.840 155.920 48 -11.055 
H4: After 2008 
All deals 
49.304 39.130 39.005 0.070 155.920 2170  
H4: After 2008 
Chinese deals 
66.700 49.298 54.840 5.910 155.920 33 17.396 
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Hypothesis 2 – Going Global strategy 
The Going global strategy was implemented in 2000, and involved a wide-range 
of regulatory and financial changes in the support system intended to promote 
outbound investments by Chinese firms. In the hypothesis part, we form the null 
hypothesis stating that the bid premium in outbound Chinese M&A is not higher 
after the Chinese Going Global strategy was implemented in 2000. This might to 
some extent be reflected in the descriptive statistics, Table 5.2 Panel B. The 
average bid premium offered by bidders in general is 49.0 percent before 2001 
and 42.3 percent after 2001 and respectively 40.2 percent and 49.1 percent among 
the Chinese bidders. This gives a negative spread of 8.8 before 2001 and a 
positive spread, meaning that Chinese bidders on average pay 6.8 percent more 
than other bidders, after 2001.  
 
Hypothesis 3 – Industry 
The industry group with SIC-codes 1000-1999 corresponds to Mining, such as; 
metal mining, coal mining, oil and gas extraction, and Construction, which 
include heavy constructions and special trade contractors. These sectors are well 
in accordance with the industries in our third hypothesis, stating that the bid 
premiums in outbound Chinese M&S are higher in certain industries such as 
energy and mineral sectors and industries comprising infrastructure which 
contributes to export of Chinese technology, compared to in other deals. 
 
Table 5.2, Panel C, presents the descriptive of a sub-sample within this particular 
SIC group, 1000-1999. The average target shareholder is offered a 46.0 percent 
takeover premium by the bidder, while the average premium offered by Chinese 
bidders is 58.2 percent. This is a spread of almost 12.2 percent between the two 
groups. The median is 34.7 percent for the general group, which is rather close to 
the median for the full dataset, while the median for the Chinese bidders is 43.0 
percent, yielding a spread of 8.3 percent.  
 
Hypothesis 4 – Financial crisis 
Table 5.2, Panel D, presents the descriptive of the premiums in sub samples 
before and after the financial crisis. In the hypotheses part, we discuss how the 
financial crisis has led to a decline in cross border M&A, while Asian companies, 
with China as a major participant has continued to increase their presence. From 
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this we formulate a null hypothesis stating that the bid premium in outbound 
Chinese M&A does not differ after the 2008 financial crisis, and we argue that 
this might be seen in the descriptive statistics. Transaction with Chinese bidder 
involved in outbound M&A corresponds to 1.2 percent of all the deals in the sub 
sample after 2008, while it is only 0.5 percent of the sample before 2008 
(57/10541 before 2008 and 26/2178 after 2008). And also, while there is a 
negative spread at 11.1 percent when comparing the average premium in general 
to the Chinese premium before 2008, the spread after 2008 is at 17.4 percent. This 
development is definitely verified by looking at the medians.  
 
5.2 Statistical description of the explanatory variables  
Table 5.3 contains a statistical description of the explanatory variables used as 
control variables in the model. Several of variables have large standard deviations. 
We consequently include the median to ensure that the interpretations based on 
the mean are not biased.  
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variable, namely the mean, 
standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum. The sample is calculated based on 
our sample of 12 700 takeover transactions between 1986 and 2011. 
Independent  
variable   
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Minimum Maximum 
1) Target 
     
Target size 2408.639 20247.830 214.0730 -184.6810 1221009.000 
2) Bidder 
     
Acquirer 
Termination Fee 
0.104 0.305 0 0 1 
3) Deal 
characteristi
cs 
     
Cash payment 0.496 0.500 0 0 1 
% Shares owned 
after 
95.124 12.518 100 50.00 100.000 
% Shares Sought 91.306 18.565 100.000 0.300 100.000 
Transaction 
Value (mil$) 
1026.522 4592.420 136.127 0.019 202785.1 
LBO 0.086 0.280 0 0 1 
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5.3 Regression analysis 
The following sections will further investigate the relationship between the bid 
premium and the bidder being Chinese. Using OLS regression, we now continue 
the analysis by controlling for other variables previously found to affect the 
premium, in order to isolate the effect of the bidder being Chinese. 
 
Similar to the descriptive chapter, we first investigate the main hypothesis, 
whether or not Chinese bidders in general involved in outbound M&A pays a 
premium compared to bidders from other countries, before we continue to 
investigate the three sub hypotheses. 
 
Control variables  
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5.4.  Some of the results are 
consistent with the findings in the literature section. The positive and significant 
% Shares Sought is in accordance with among others Billett and Ryngaert’s 
(1997) and Hope, Thomas & Vyas’s (2010) research,  and the positive Cash 
payment variable coefficient is in line with among others Betton, Eckbo and 
Thorburn’s (2008b) studies.  
 
In addition to the variables presented above, also Log(transaction value), the LBO 
variable and both Time(2001)- and Time(2008)-dummy is statistical significant at 
a 1 % level. 
 
In this thesis the adjusted R2 has been used as a measurement, since the standard 
R2 is not adjusted for the number of parameters in the model. R2 does almost 
always increase and nearly never decrease when adding a parameter. This implies 
that R2 gives an exceptionally optimistic picture of the regression models fit to the 
reality (Gujarati, 2003). 
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Table 5.4 Determinants of the takeover premium 
This table presents the results of five OLS regression for the main sample of individual 
deals, 12.700 deals, between 1986 and 2011. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the bid premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the 
target four weeks before the announcement. H1 denote hypothesis 1, H2 is Hypothesis 2, 
etc.. Note that the figures in parenthesis are standard errors.  
Significant levels * = 1%, ** = 5%, *** = 10%   
 
 
PANEL A 
H1 - 
All deals 
PANEL B 
H2 - 
Go global  
PANEL C 
H3 -  
Industry 
PANEL D 
H2&3 -
Combined 
PANEL E 
H4 -  
Fin. crisis 
Key explanatory variables: 
Chinese bidder -0.092 
(0.139) 
    
Chinese bidder + time 
dummy(2001) 
 -0.092 
(0.139) 
   
Chinese bidder + industry 
dummy(SIC 1000-1999) 
  0.284* 
(0.093) 
  
Chinese bidder + industry 
(SIC 1000) + time 
dummy(2001) 
   0.284* 
(0.093) 
 
Chinese bidder + time 
dummy(2008) 
    0.408** 
(0.171) 
Control variables: 
Target size -3.66E-07 
(4.57E-07) 
-3.66E-07 
(4.57E-07) 
-3.63E-07 
(4.57E-07) 
-3.63E-07 
(4.57E-07) 
-3.63E-07 
(4.57E-07) 
Termination fee -0.046 
(0.032) 
-0.046 
(0.032) 
-0.047 
(0.032) 
-0.047 
 (0.032) 
-0.047 
 (0.032) 
Cash payment 0.129* 
(0.021) 
0.129* 
(0.020) 
0.129* 
(0.020) 
0.127* 
(0.021) 
0.128* 
(0.020) 
% Shares owned after 
trans. 
0.387* 
(0.087) 
0.387* 
(0.087) 
0.387* 
(0.087) 
0.389* 
(0.087) 
0.389* 
(0.087) 
% Shares Sought 0.270* 
(0.044) 
0.270* 
(0.044) 
0.270* 
(0.044) 
0.271* 
(0.045) 
0.271* 
(0.045) 
Log (Transaction value) -0.031* 
(0.005) 
-0.031* 
(0.005) 
-0.031* 
(0.005) 
-0.031* 
(0.005) 
-0.031* 
(0.005) 
LBO -0.093* 
(0.032) 
-0.093* 
(0.032) 
-0.092* 
(0.032) 
-0.092* 
(0.032) 
-0.092* 
(0.032) 
Industry dummy (SIC 
1000-1999) 
0.005 
(0.031) 
0.005 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.031) 
0.0002 
(0.030) 
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Time dummy 2001 -0.300* 
(0.022) 
-0.300* 
(0.022) 
-0.300* 
(0.022) 
-0.266* 
(0.022) 
-0.265* 
(0.021 
Time dummy 2008 0.274* 
(0.030) 
0.274* 
(0.030) 
0.272* 
(0.030) 
0.272* 
(0.030) 
0.270* 
(0.030) 
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Chinese bids in general 
The results in table 5.4 Panel A, corresponds to our first hypothesis, where we 
simply investigate whether an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
bidder is Chinese, has an impact on the bid premium. This variable, the Chinese 
bidder dummy coefficient is not significant. This means that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, and hence do not find any evidence that Chinese bidders involved 
in outbound M&A do pay a higher premium compared to other bidders.  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Going Global strategy 
The results from the regression testing the Going Global strategy hypothesis, is 
found in Table 5.4 Panel B. The key explanatory variable in this regression is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is Chinese and the bid is 
carried out after year 2001. This variable is not significant, and does not make us 
able to reject our null hypothesis.  Again, we do not find any evidence that allows 
us to say that Chinese outbound deals that are carried out after 2001 have a higher 
premium compared to other deals in general. 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Industry 
Table 5.4, Panel C presents the results of the regression model corresponding to 
hypothesis 3, stating that the bid premium in outbound Chinese M&A is higher in 
certain industries, compared to the premium in other deals. An indicator variable 
with the value 1 if the bidder is Chinese and target is in SIC group 1000 -1999 is 
used as key independent variable. This dummy variable is positive and significant 
at 1% level. A beta coefficient of 0.284 corresponds to a 32.8 percent6 increase in 
                                                 
6 A beta coefficient of 0.284 is the ratio of the geometric mean for Chinese bidder group to the 
geometric mean for all other bidders. We can say that the expected percent increase in geometric 
mean from all other bidder group is about 32.8% holding the other variables constant, since 
exp(0.284) = 1.32843293. 
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the takeover premium if the acquire are of Chinese nationality and the target is in 
industry group 1000-1999. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Another interesting finding important to point out is that the dummy variable (SIC 
1000-1999) representing all deals within this industry are not significant at all, 
backing up our presumptions that this is not a common feature for this SIC-group 
in general.  
 
In order to verify this result we have run regressions on the three additional SIC-
groups which contained an adequate number of Chinese outbound deals. These 
groups are presented in Table 4.2. However, none of the additional groups 
provided us with results similar to SIC- group 1000-1999; positive and significant 
coefficients. These regression results can be found in Appendix A.  
 
A regression that combines hypothesis 2 and 3 is also carried out, presented in 
Panel D. The key independent variable in this regression is an indicator variable 
that has the value of 1 if all three criteria are fulfilled; the bidder is Chinese, the 
target is in SIC group 1000-1999 and the transaction happened after 2000. 
Unfortunately, only one transaction is excluded in this new variable compared to 
the independent variable in Panel C. (Only one of the transactions with Chinese 
bidder acquiring a target abroad, within SIC group 1000-1999, is carried out 
before 2001). This gives us a positive and significant coefficient, with the exact 
same value as this key independent variable 0.284 in Panel D. We are therefore, 
because of inadequate number of Chinese deals in SIC group 1000-1999 before 
2001, unable to test whether the Going Global strategy affects these industries 
(SIC 1000-1999) in particular.  
 
Hypothesis 4 – Financial crisis 
Contrary to hypothesis 2, the results in Table 5.4 Panel E provide us with a 
positive coefficient which is significant at 5% level. The combined dummy with 
value 1 if the bidder is Chinese and the transaction is carried out in 2008 and after 
2008 has a coefficient of 0.408, which corresponds to a 50.4 percent7 increase in 
the takeover premium if the acquirer is of Chinese nationality and the transaction 
                                                 
7 Since exp(0.408) = 1.80380716. 
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is carried out during or after 2008.  This means that we can reject the null 
hypothesis, saying that the bid premium in outbound Chinese M&A does not differ 
after the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
5.5 Statistical remarks 
The models have been tested for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, 
multicollinearity and normality. We have problems with heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the data sets for all the models, which results in our coefficients 
estimates still being unbiased, but they are inefficient, i.e. they are not BLUE 
(Best linear unbiased estimators). (Brooks 2008). All results presented in table 5.4 
have been corrected with the Newey-West remedy.  The Newey-West remedy is a 
variance-covariance estimator consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation (Brooks 2008). Further tests applied to the model do not 
provide any signs of multicollinearity. We do have issues regarding non-normality 
in the model.  
 
When applying the F-test for multiple regressions all the coefficients in the 
models are significant different from zero and we can reject the null hypothesis 
for all of them. In other words the models have explanatory power with respect to 
the bid premium. The independent variables explain some of the effect on the bid 
premium. All the models are significant.  
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6. Conclusion  
It is commonly assumed that that the unique Chinese context due to the country’s 
spectacular economic growth and communist state control provides Chinese firms 
with different premises than firms in other parts of the world. In academic papers 
in the field of International Business Management, non-academic publications and 
among people in the world of finance and other industries, it is argued that this 
affects the bid premium and that Chinese firms overpay when acquiring firms in 
other counties. While there exist extensive research about the determinants of the 
acquisition premium, few papers are written aiming to examine country specific 
factors. No previous studies in the field of Finance is found investigating the 
relationship between the bid premium and the acquirer firm being Chinese.   
 
In this thesis report we do find evidence that when Chinese bidders are involved 
in outbound mergers and acquisitions of targets in the industry groups that 
comprise Mining; metal mining, coal mining, oil and gas extraction, and 
Construction; heavy constructions and special trade contractors, they do pay a 
higher premium compared to other deals. Our results show that Chinese bidders 
involved in outbound M&A in this particular industry group have a 32.8 percent 
increase in the takeover premium, compared to all other bidders. These industries 
matches the industries in which Chinese government has created incentives for 
Chinese firm to acquire in overseas markets, through the Going Global strategy 
and 2004 guidelines, and are also essential to secure further growth in the Chinese 
economy. 
 
We also find evidence supporting our last sub hypothesis, and have reasons to 
believe that China bidders pay a higher premium compared to other bidders based 
on their favorable position in the world economy after the financial crisis in 
2007/2008. The years after the financial crises has led to a decline in M&A 
volumes, with a particular retrenchment in cross-border activity, Asian companies 
with China as a major participant has continued to increase their presence. How 
this is directly linked to the bid premium might have different explanations, 
however it is a fact that while most European countries and companies has 
experienced a recession, the Chinese economy has grown (until recently) at a two 
digit speed. Our results are positive and significant, with a beta coefficient 
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corresponding to a 50.4 percent increase in the takeover premium, if the acquirer 
firms are Chinese and the transaction is carried out in 2008 and after. 
 
We do not find any evidence suggesting that Chinese firms in general pay a higher 
premium, compared to other bidders when involved in outbound M&A 
transactions. This is apparent from both the descriptive data and regression 
analysis. However, due to data availability and the definition of the bid premium, 
M&A of private character are not included in the analysis. If we were able to 
include private deals we might have obtained different results.  
 
All results and analysis must off course be seen in light of several weaknesses 
when it comes to data availability; the fact that we only analyze public companies, 
the reporting procedures within China that has been weak, but are improving, the 
phenomenon of round-tripping, missing data in control variables, and the few 
Chinese observations in the datasets of the sub-hypothesis are examples backing 
this.   
 
For future research on the topic we suggest including the private transactions in 
order to obtain a larger sample number and even more interesting data.  
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APPENDIX A 
Results from industry groups 
This table presents the results of three OLS regression for the remaining three industry 
groups SIC 2000 – 3999, 6000 – 6999 and 7000 – 7999. Main sample of individual deals, 
12.700 deals, the Chinese outbound deals within each group are 28, 11 and 7 respectively 
and time period stretches between 1986 and 2011. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the bid premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the 
target four weeks before the announcement. Note that the figures in parenthesis are 
standard errors. Significant levels * = 1%, ** = 5%, *** = 10%  
 
 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
 
SIC 2000-3999 
Industry 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate  
SIC 6000-6999 
Industry 
Services 
 
SIC 7000-7999 
Chinese bidder + 
industry dummy(SIC 
2000 - 3999) 
-0.060 
(0.213) 
  
 
Chinese bidder + 
industry dummy(SIC 
6000 - 6999) 
 -0.551 
(0.338) 
 
Chinese bidder + 
industry dummy(SIC 
7000 - 7999) 
  -0.617*** 
(0.372) 
 
Target size -2.97E-07 
(4.29E-07) 
4.48E-08 (4.39E-07) -3.11E-07 (4.29E-
07) 
Termination fee -0.0456 
(0.029) 
-0.056** 
(0.029) 
-0.051*** 
(0.029) 
Cash payment 0.121* 
(0.019) 
0.113* 
(0.019) 
0.123* 
(0.019) 
% Shares owned after 
trans. 
0.394* 
(0.089) 
0.391* 
(0.090) 
0.385* 
(0.089) 
% Shares Sought 0.272* 
(0.047) 
0.277* 
(0.047) 
0.266* 
(0.046) 
Log (Transaction 
value) 
-0.032* 
(0.005) 
-0.033* 
(0.005) 
-0.031* 
(0.005) 
LBO -0.095* 
(0.027) 
-0.113* 
(0.027) 
-0.095* 
(0.027) 
Industry dummy of 
respective industry 
0.068* 
(0.020) 
-0.175* 
(0.025) 
0.126* 
(0.023) 
Time 2001 -0.295* 
(0.020) 
-0.303* 
(0.020) 
-0.308* 
(0.020) 
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Time 2008 0.277* 
(0.028) 
0.260* 
(0.027) 
0.274* 
(0.027) 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.053 0.050 
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Abstract 
In this preliminary thesis report we will introduce the ongoing work with our 
Master Thesis in the field Finance.  The main question we have chosen to analyze 
is whether Chinese firms pay a higher premium (relative to companies from other 
countries) when they acquire assets abroad. The background for why we find it 
interesting is the ongoing discussion worldwide regarding Chinas growing 
importance in the world economy and the observations of Chinas aggressive 
development in outbound M&A activity. This is also insinuated from people in 
the industry - that Chinese firms to a larger extend are pay a higher bid premium 
compared to others.   
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, mergers and acquisition activity has increased rapidly 
around the world, and cross-border M&A activity which are increasing 
proportionately accounts today for almost a quarter of the global M&A volume 
(UNCTAD 2011). According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), developing countries have showed an increasing 
interest for cross-border M&A during the past two decades.  An interesting feature 
of this cross border M&A wave is the series of high-profile bids by firms from 
China. M&A’s are becoming an important way to enter foreign markets by firms 
from developing and transition economies (UNCTAD 2006).  
 
China in particular has stepped onto the world stage following the turmoil 
that a afflicted the global financial system since the financial crisis in 2008. 
Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the Chinese outbound M&A market, 
where activity has remained solid the last years, outbound deals accounting from 
10% of overall Chinese M&A activity. Some of the bids originated from China 
have been accompanied by a huge media frenzy, political interference, and 
nationalistic talk (both in the acquiring and the target country). Notable examples 
are the bid for Unocal by Chinese-owned CNOOC, Lenovo’s acquisition of 
IBM’s personal computer business, and the geographically nearer ones, Volvo 
Cars and Norwegian Elkem acquired by respectively Geely Automobile and 
China National Agrochemical. While these deals are examples of increasing 
financial power and confidence in China, it remains an open question whether 
these companies bid higher (relative to companies from other countries) in their 
quest for international expansion. 
 
This report is organized as follows; in the next section we present the 
related literature with regards to previous research on bid premiums and 
determinants of Chinese outbound M&As. The third section constructs the 
hypothesis and research problem. The data and sample are described in the fourth 
section. The research design and methodology are presented in the fifth section, 
and the final section concludes.  
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2 Litterateur review 
This literature review is divided in two main parts. First and foremost we 
review literature on bid premium and bid premium determinants in general. We 
have made an attempt to find research on topics similar to the one we will 
examine. In the second part we present literature on the determinants of Chinese 
outbound M&A´s. The purpose of the latter part is to introduce the motivations 
for Chinese firms to paying a premium, which again provides support for our 
hypothesis.  
2.1 Literature on Bid Premium 
Acquisitions offer a great growth opportunity for many companies. 
Potential economies of scale, synergies, tax savings or vertical integration make 
this form of growth interesting for most companies compared to organic growth 
that is more time consuming. Thus, in sum, research finds that bidder deal-related 
abnormal returns are often negative (Eckbo 2009). 
 
Roll (1986) was the first to suggest that bidder’s overconfidence or 
“hubris” may go a long way in explaining the surprisingly low bidder takeover 
gains. The relative poor bidder performance remains a pervasive and puzzeling 
phenomenon also today. Since part of the problem is one of properly estimating 
and interpreting bidder announcement returns, however, direct evidence on offer 
premium and bidding behavior is of key interest in this debate (Eckbo 2009).  
 
Richard Roll (1986) formed the Hubris hypothesis, which implies that 
individual decision makers in bidding firms may pay a premium to acquire an 
asset that the market has already correctly valued for their own personal motives. 
Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets. This 
phenomenon is also known as Winners curse.  He points out that hubris 
hypotheses are consistent with strong –form market efficiency. Financial markets 
are assumed to be efficient in that asset prices reflect all information about 
individual firms. Most other explanations rely on strong-form market inefficiency, 
at least temporary.  
 
Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) find that the average premium paid for 
American acquisitions between 1980 and 2002 equals 48 % of the market value of 
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the target before the initial bid, and some premiums even exceed 100%. Like Roll, 
they also emphasize the fact that large amounts spend when acquiring the target 
do not always yield the anticipated outcome because some companies tend to 
overvalue the potential of the transaction.   
 
 Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008b) investigate cross-sectional 
determinants of the bid premium by analyzing 5,921 targets between 1980 and 
2002. They categorize explanatory variables into “Target characteristics”, “Bidder 
characteristics”, and “Deal characteristics”  and their main findings are as follows; 
First, the initial and final offer premiums are higher after the 1980s, when the 
bidder is a public company; when the initial bid is an all-cash offer, and the higher 
the pre-bid target run-up. Secondly, important findings form this study are that the 
initial and final offer premiums are lower the greater the target total equity 
capitalization prior to the initial bid; when the target’s book-to-market ratio (B/M) 
exceeds the industry median B/M; when the initial bid is a tender offer; and when 
the initial bidder has a positive toehold. Thirdly, the initial and final offer 
premiums are unaffected by the presence of a target poison pill, a garget hostility 
to the initial bid; the presence of multiple bidders; and whether the takeover is 
horizontal.” (Eckbo 2008a) 
 
Along with Eckbo, Betton and Thorburn, numerous of other researchers have 
contributed with takeover premium literature. Schwert (1996) presents cross-
sectional regression of takeover-induced target abnormal stock return (premium) 
and find like Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008b), that the premium is higher for 
all-cash offers and for multiple bids. In his sample, the bid premium is also higher 
for tender offers. Officer (2003) finds that merger deals with target termination 
fees involve significantly higher premiums and success rates than deals without 
such clauses. Bates and Lemmon (2003) also investigate target fee grants and find 
evidence that deal premiums are higher in transactions that include such fees, after 
controls for various deal and target characteristics.  
 
Levi, Li, Zhang (2008) combine data from both SDC and RiskMetrics 
Group and suggest that the takeover premium are influenced by the gender 
composition of the board. Accurately, bid premiums are lower when the CEO of 
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the acquiring firm is female, and the higher the target board’s proportion of 
female directors.  
 
When it comes to examining country- or region-specific factors and 
difference in the bid premium, we have not been able to find a lot of research. 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) study the determinants of mergers and acquisitions 
around the world by focusing on differences in law and regulations across 
countries. They find that the volume of M&A activity is significantly larger in 
countries with better accounting standards and shareholder protection, and also 
that the bid premiums is higher in countries with higher shareholder protection.   
 
Thus, more relevant to our research question; Hope, Thomas and Vyas 
(2010) find that the bid premiums from developing countries, i.e. firms from 
developing countries involved with M&As in developed countries, are higher than 
the bid premium in outbound M&As from developed countries. They aim at 
analyzing if the higher bids by firms from developing countries are affected by 
national pride, and in doing so, tests their data on bid premiums between 
developing and developed countries using an extensive amount of control 
variables. 
2.2 Determinants of Chinese outward FDI 
Thus we have not been able to find prior academic research that examines 
the bid premium in Chinese outbound M&A deals, Chinese “overbidding” has 
been discussed in different other publications and the rationale behind the 
phenomenon is widely analyzed in the international management field.  
 
A McKinsey report from 2008 claims that “They (Chinese firms) have 
underwhelmed the market by the standard of value creation measured thorough 
share price movement around the time of announcement, namely, the deal value 
added, and proportion overpaid. Although, drawn from a relatively small sample, 
our analysis suggests that Chinese acquirers tend to overpay in a little more than 
half of all deals and that the capital markets on average discount the value of the 
combined entities.” (McKinsey 2008, 11) They further argue that deals of Chinese 
firms between 1995-2007 performed less favorably than those of Western did. A 
Deloitte publication, also examining the Chinese outflow M&A deals suggest the 
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same. Head of Deloitte China M&A Services & Global Chinese Services Group 
Co-Chairman, Lawrence Chia, argues that state-sanctioned acquisitions are an 
important driver for Chinese outflow M&As; “with Chinese state-owned 
enterprises being offered large loans or credit agreements at preferential rates in 
order to purchase foreign assets” (Deloitte 2009, 7-8). At the same time, Chia also 
notes that Chinese SOEs are conducting outbound M&A acquisitions as they look 
to grow their business in order to prevent takeover bids from lager domestic 
rivals. “Buying assets overseas is a sign of strength”, he says. “In addition, such 
businesses do not have to return cash to any stakeholders and are therefore in a 
position to finance such acquisitions.” (Deloitte 2009, 8) 
 
A growing number of articles have been published the last years which 
looks at the motivations of Chinese firms to expand internationally. Most 
researcher (Buckley, 2007; Morck, 2007; Poncet, 2007) agree that classical 
motivations play the key role: Chinese firms are to various extents market-
seeking, resource-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking. However, these 
characteristics, originally developed in a Western context and for Western 
companies, do not completely reveal all motivations of Chinese foreign direct 
investments (Gugler and Boie 2008). 
 
Buckley (2008) argue that there are three potential arguments to why FDI 
from emerging economies and China in particular require a different approach to 
theory, then general internalization theory. These are; capital market 
imperfections, the special ownership advantages of Chinese MNEs and 
institutional factors. All three of these are in our opinion to some extent important 
in order to support our hypothesis; that Chinese M&A’s are carried out with a bid 
premium.  
 
Capital market imperfections, which may mean that capital is available at 
below market rates for a considerable period of time, arise in China for a number 
of particular inter-related imperfections; Warner et al. (2004) and others suggests 
that state-owned (and state-associated) firms may have capital made available to 
them at below market rates. He also points at the fact that inefficient banking 
systems may make soft loans to potential outward investors. Third, conglomerate 
firms may operate an internal inefficient capital market that subsidizes outflow 
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M&A’s (Liu, 2006), and finally, family-owned firms may have access to cheap 
capital from family members. Buckley et al. (2007) argue that there are good 
reasons to believe that all four of these imperfections exist in China. State-
sponsored soft budget constraints make acquisitions by Chinese firms a normal 
mode of entering and penetrating a host economy. 
 
Ma and Andrews-Speed (2006) specifically discuss the reasons why 
Chinese national oil companies “overbid”, which is here defined as paying more 
for the asset than prevailing market price. They lists reasons in addition to capital 
market imperfection as already mentioned above, such as: their commercial world 
view, their strategy, their inexperience and the role of the government. Close 
support from the Chinese government may indeed lower the political risk in some 
countries, which combined with access to loans from state-owned commercial 
banks will result in China’s national oil companies having a lower cost of capital 
than international oil companies. The authors addresses the question on which 
cases of “overbidding” are the result of deliberate strategy and which are the result 
of inexperience, as one of their major questions.  
 
3 Hypothesis and Research question 
3.1 Hypotesis 
As can be seen from the literature review, the last decade has provided us 
with an extensive amount of research on both takeover premiums and its 
determinants, and on determinants of Chinese outflow M&As. Several of 
publications, and articles from the international management field, claim and 
argue why Chinese firms tend to “overbid”, relative to companies from other 
countries, when involved in international contests. We have however not found 
any academic research proving this fact. Hence, our hypothesis is as follows;  
 
H0 : The bid premiums in outbound Chinese M&A are higher than for deals in 
general.  
3.2 Research question 
Does Chinese firms on average bid higher to acquire assets outside of China, 
compared to bids in general? 
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3.3 Definition of Bid Premium 
Prior to the availability of offer prices in databases such as Thomson’s 
SDC, the empirical takeover literature conventionally used target cumulative 
abnormal stock returns around takeover bids as a proxy for bid premiums. This 
proxy is problematic as target abnormal stock returns reflect not only the offer 
price but also the probability of competition and bid failure at the initial offer date. 
The reducing effect of the residual uncertainty about bid success at the initial offer 
announcement is important. It tends to produce bid premium at about 25-30% 
when the true offer premium according to Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) is 
45-50%. In principle, the correct base price is the pre-offer secondary market 
price of the target which the bidder relies on in order to determine the initial bid 
premiums. While this base price is unobservable, it is common to select a target 
share price two or three months prior to the first bid. Eckbo (2008) and several of 
other researchers use the price 42 trading days prior to the initial offer 
announcement as base price. The usual reason for doing this is that a price this far 
back from the initial bid is largely free of market anticipation of the pending offer 
(Ekcbo 2008).  
 
4 Data 
Our sample at this moment contains mergers and acquisitions announced 
between March 1, 1986 and December 31, 2010, reported by SDC (Merger and 
Acquisitions database), a database from Thomson Financial, which professor 
Øyvind Norli from BI Norwegian School of Management has kindly provided us 
with.  This data includes a sample on 19305 deals in total. To investigate whether 
the nationality of Chinese firms is a cross-sectional determinant of the bid 
premium, we select only bids made by Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
for targets outside these areas. This reduces our sample to158 deals.  
 
By adding similar restrictions to the Zephyr (Mergers and Acquisitions) 
database we find a sample at about the same size. However, a larger portion of 
these deals are European. 
 
In the Deloitte publication; “The emergence of China: New frontiers in 
outbound M&A” (2009), a third M&A database, mergermoney, is used. In this 
report the authors carefully describe reasonable restrictions for narrowing down 
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the number of deals; Chinese outbound deals only, controlling stake, deal value 
above US$ 5 M, only completed deals, etc., and end up with 437 deals between 
2003 and 2009. This includes both private and public deals. We will contact 
Deloitte, or if necessary others, in order to access this data.  
 
We hope to be able to run the same regression, with the same control 
variables on all 3 datasets.  
 
5 Methodology 
In order to examine whether firms from China (versus other countries) pay 
a higher premium when bidding for firms outside of China, we adopt and expand 
on the empirical model used by Rossi and Volpin (2004). The following 
regression model is estimated; 
 
Log (Premium)i  = α0 + β1 (China)  +β2 (Control variables) + ei 
 
We will regress the log of the bid premium, in which the premium is the bid price 
as percentage of the target’s closing price four weeks before the announcement of 
the deal, on an indicator variable for the bidder’s country (equal to one for 
Chinese firms and zero otherwise).  
 
We will include control variable identified by prior literature, and are 
motivated by Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008b) which group the explanatory 
variables into target characteristics, bidder characteristics, and deal characteristics. 
The target characteristics control variables include among others; target firm size 
(log of net assets), target current profit margin, and target industry fixed effect 
(using two-digit SIC codes) which captures factors such risk and growth 
characteristics. When it comes to deal characteristics that could influence the 
transaction, consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004), we control for competing 
bids, tender offers, whether the bid is hostile or not and whether the bid is for cash 
or stock. Finally, the bidder characteristics which will be among the control 
variables are positive toehold and whether or not it is a horizontal takeover (Eckbo 
2009).  
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6 Summary and way forward 
In this preliminary thesis report we have reviewed previous literature from 
relevant papers regarding the topic chosesn. Our intention is to extend the 
litterateur review and we see that the challenge lies in selecting the most relevant 
once and those that may best contribute to our work and lead us in the right 
direction. Further, we have described our research question and hypothesis and 
presented the data we have so far. The way forward is to complement the data and 
find the most relevant control variables to be able start analyzing the data. We 
hope to find some interesting results to present in our final Master Thesis; it 
would be particular exciting since we cannot find any academic research that has 
already investigated the specific hypothesis and because in our opinion is a 
particular interesting topic considering the situation and development of Chinas 
role  in the world economy.   
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